If you can boast of anything Florentino Pérez is to be the President with best record of Real Madrid after Santiago Bernabeu: In his two stages at the helm of the white club, he has won four Leagues, five Champions, two Copa del Rey, one Intercontinental, four Club World Cups, four European Super Cups and four other Spanish Super Cups. And although his first season as president of Madrid (2000-2001) he was a true success, with the galactic signing of Figo and the conquest of the leagueFlorentino met the bitter taste of defeat as soon as he arrived in his first two finals as president of the white club, in the European Super Cup against Galatasaray and at the Intercontinental before Boca Juniors. Real Madrid came from win the eighth in Paris against Valencia (3-0) with a team that ended fifth in LaLiga and what did you find in the interim Vicente del Bosque, who had replaced Toshack in the mid 99/00, a full man Able to know how to deal with a locker room full of egos, as historically has been the target, and turn it into a champion team. The then president Lorenzo Sanz, overwhelmed by his recent wins (two Champions in three years) called elections under the guarantee of his sporting successes, which made him think he was invincible, and took a setback. Florentino beat him at the polls with the promise to the members that he would sign the Barcelona player Luis Figo, considered then the best player in the world, for 60 million euros. Florentino was contractually tied to the Portuguese, who reached an agreement with the candidate with the idea of putting pressure on Barça to improve his salary assuming that Sanz would win the elections. But Florentino got away with it.In addition to the Portuguese, Pérez signed that year Caesar for goal, to Munitis and Solari to reinforce the attack and Flavio Conçeicao, Celades and Makelele to replace the loss of Fernando Redondo, one of the closest men to Lorenzo Sanz in the white dressing room. Round had been the game director Madrid in six previous seasons, in which Madrid won two Champions, two Leagues and an Intercontinental and in which the Argentinean alone took the baton from the midfield of Madrid, and his low was noticed in the first matches of the new Florentine stage. In fact, Florentino’s first official meeting as manager of Real Madrid was the final of the European Super Cup that faced whites with the UEFA champion Galatasaray, and it turned out to be his first big stick as president. Mircea Lucescu had collected the reins of the Galatasaray after the Fatih Terim march, that same summer he signed for Milan as soon as he won UEFA. The transfer of powers between two of the best technicians in the history of Eastern Europe could not have started better. In the first Super Cup that faced the champion of the Champions League with that of UEFA (previously the Recopa champion went) the Turks, led by Jardel and Hagi they beat Madrid in overtime (2-1) with a golden goal from the Brazilian striker, who had already scored the previous goal for his team (Raúl scored the goal for Madrid) and which left Florentino without his first title and what would have been the first European Super Cup in the white cabinets . Few moths later it was Boca Juniors in the Intercontinental Cup who would postpone Florentino’s first success. Carlos Bianchi he directed the Buenos Aires team, which had just won the Libertadores at the start of one of the best stages in its history (the Argentines would achieve three liberators in four years), with two players who stood out above the rest: Martín Palermo and Juan Román Riquelme. Boca won (2-1) but the result was short after seeing what happened on the grass. Argentines they danced to Madrid with a spectacular Riquelme and Palermo made both goals from Buenos Aires shortly after the match started. The goal of Roberto Carlos it only served to make up the marker.Despite these two hard knocks, the Madrid was a real hammer pylon in the League. Makelele took the position in the midfield, Figo took very little in adapting to the team and Raúl, who finished pichichi, He led a team that successfully won the domestic competition. To the next year The Ninth would come and two seasons later Florentino removed the thorn from his first months as president with the conquest of the Supercup against Feyenoord (3-1) and the Intercontinental against Olimpia de Paraguay (2-1).
Share10Tweet6Share12Email28 Shares September 26, 2014; ProPublica The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is not a nonprofit organization, but this ProPublica article about a confidential report about the Fed has lessons for nonprofits. Leading up to the Great Recession, the New York Fed was the expected central player in developing protections for the nation’s financial system. According to ProPublica’s Jake Bernstein, the Fed “failed miserably in catching the meltdown.” The president of the New York Fed, William Dudley, recruited Columbia University finance professor David Beim to investigate why the Fed failed.As in many nonprofits, the problem was found to be the Fed’s culture. “The New York Fed had become too risk-averse and deferential to the banks it supervised,” as Bernstein summarized Beim’s conclusions. “Its examiners feared contradicting bosses, who too often forced their findings into an institutional consensus that watered down much of what they did.”Beim’s findings were validated by the events surrounding the firing of a new examiner, Carmen Segarra, who had issued a negative report about Goldman Sachs. Segarra sued to challenge her firing, charging that she had been the victim of retaliation because she had refused to back down from her Goldman Sachs finding. In a fascinating turn, Segarra had been concerned about what was happening with her, so she purchased a tiny recorder at the Spy Store to record what would become 46 hours of conversations with her Fed colleagues.Segarra’s recordings constituted an amazing case study of the cultural obstacles at the New York Fed that Beim had found in his study. In Bernstein’s words, Beim’s report “laid bare a culture ruled by groupthink, where managers used consensus decision-making and layers of vetting to water down findings. Examiners feared to speak up lest they make a mistake or contradict higher-ups. Excessive secrecy stymied action and empowered gatekeepers, who used their authority to protect the banks they supervised.”“Our review of lessons learned from the crisis reveals a culture that is too risk-averse to respond quickly and flexibly to new challenges,” the report concluded. “A number of people believe that supervisors paid excessive deference to banks, and as a result they were less aggressive in finding issues or in following up on them in a forceful way.”Beim’s report called for “hiring ‘out-of-the-box thinkers,’ even at the risk of getting ‘disruptive personalities’…expert examiners who would be contrarian, ask difficult questions, and challenge the prevailing orthodoxy.”While the details of the Segarra story are compelling reading, the organizational elements of Fed culture revelations have broad application to the nonprofit sector. How many nonprofit watchdogs end up soft-pedaling their critiques, captured by the entities they were supposed to monitor much like the banks having captured the New York Fed? How many organizations find themselves unable to break out of pernicious, narrowing cultures that frustrate attempts to do the right thing? Nonprofit Quarterly has often written about the stultifying, hard-to-change dimensions of organizational culture overcoming the efforts of new leadership and new policies. Organizational culture won at the New York Fed too—and contributed to a devastating national economic recession in the process.—Rick Cohen Share10Tweet6Share12Email28 Shares